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INTRODUCTION 
In the Netherlands a second phase of more market oriented Public Transport has started. In 
the first phase the Public Transport Authorities (PTAs) had a difficult task of learning their 
new role and introducing competitive tendering as laid down in the new transport act (Wet 
Personenvervoer 2000). 
 
Tendering in the Netherlands until this moment is not working as it is meant by Law. The new 
transport act has two goals for public transport. The first goal is to increase profitability and 
lower government spending on transport. Secondly, it aims to raise the number of passengers 
in public transport.  
The processes are only focused on service quantities and costs. It doesn’t concern passenger 
usage and satisfaction. This paper is a search for the balance between competition and market 
regulation and the appropriate method of tendering in this region, considering the goals as set 
by law. 
 
First we will discuss the organization models as applied in Sweden and Great Britain. The 
Dutch tender system is comparable with the Scandinavian system, but there are facets we can 
learn from. Great Britain has changed their public transport organization system over the last 
two decades and is going to a process of regaining control over public transport. 
The lessons learned will be summarized and a case study of the Netherlands latest tender will 
be presented next. In the conclusions we address the advantages of both organization models 
and the competitive dialogue. 
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SCANDINAVIAN ORGANIZATION MODEL 
In Denmark, Sweden and Norway most public transport services are organized through public 
tenders. PTAs were created in the early 80s to uniform the public transport environment an set 
tariffs, develop comprehensive bus networks and negotiate on economic compensation with 
the operator. The PTAs geographically covered the Swedish provinces or metropolitan areas 
and were governed by counselors of cities and districts.  
 
Swedish state government had to cut the public transport budget as a result of the economic 
situation in the late eighties. Tendering seemed to be a solution to lower public spending. In 
1989 the tender model was implemented by law and since 1990 the PTAs are also 
accountable for regional railways. In the beginning the PTAs formulated contracts with the 
existing operators. As of 1989 the PTAs took control through tendering. The PTAs 
determined the transport networks and frequencies, even timetables and appearance of the 
buses was laid down.  
In recent years a shift of emphasis from price towards quality is recognized through Denmark 
and Sweden. Norway is lagging behind 
 
In Sweden’s capital Stockholm, the former transport company SL (StorStockholm 
Lokaltraffik) is now the PTA. International bus company’s like Arriva and Veolia submit on 
the issued tenders and carry out de production. SL sets requirements for operating public 
transport through a tender document (Nielsen, 2008 and Bruijnes, 2006). 
 
Comparison 
We can state that the most important characteristics of the Scandinavian tender model are (1) 
the dominant position of the PTA, (2) competition through tendering and (3) mainly private 
operators. 
 
This model lowered costs initially and it did raise public transport use. From the nineteen 
nineties the PTAs started experimenting with tendering. Different from the Dutch situation, 
mobility goals were of less importance than cost reduction. Priority lay at control of 
expenditure instead of reduction of auto kilometers and changing modal split. Most recently 
Swedish PTAs encounter an increase of cost of public transport, while on the other hand 
passenger satisfaction is declining. 
 
Because of the great set of rules the PTAs implied on the contracts, powers changed. PTAs 
were leading in the development of public transport networks and kept an eye on the 
performances of the operators through monitoring. In relation to Dutch practice of the 
regional governments in the Netherlands little or nothing seems to be left to the operators. 
They merely carry out the plans and schedules prepared by the PTAs. In the Dutch province 
of Noord-Brabant public transport is organized according to a gross-contract similar to many 
regions in Scandinavia. The province has taken control over public transport since failure in 
previous tenders. 
 
 
Continental Drift  3 
 
 
In the Scandinavian countries Denmark en Sweden the operators are controlled by the PTAs 
through monitoring of the activities. Operators pay fines if they do not meet the imposed 
requirements of the PTE. This way the operators are bound to their contract. 
BRITISH ORGANIZATION MODEL 
Until the nineteen eighties, Britain’s public transport system developed like any other 
Western European transport market. Transport companies merged to coop with passenger 
usage decline and the Passenger Transport Authorities (PTA) and Passenger Transport 
Executives (PTE)  – established by the Transport Act of 1968 – took more responsibilities in 
the field. The PTAs were the administrative bodies for the PTEs. The PTEs are bodies which 
are responsible for public transport within large urban areas 
In 1985 the conservative government decided to introduce a free market system in public bus 
transport. Their goal was to take away hamperings for new companies, improve service levels 
and deregulation of the industry itself. 
Through easy access to the market, competition and less regulations the goals of the 1985 
Transport Act were less public funding and better quality in public transport. 
 
Transport Act of 1985 
In Great Britain the Transport Act of 1985 has led to drastic privatization of the public 
transport industry. All government involvement regarding public transport was recalled. The 
public transport operators were given all liberties to develop, finance and operate transport 
networks. As operators concentrated on the routes which are commercially feasible, the 
Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs) are solely responsible to buy additional transport 
services which are socially necessary. The operators collect ticket revenue directly. 
 
Bus services in Great Britain were, under the Transport Act of 1985 run under two different 
circumstances: 
 
- Commercial routes, run by private operators with no intervention of the PTE. All 
routes and tariffs were set by private bus companies. 
 
- Social contracts through tender by private operators. PTE buy extra services to 
complete the regional bus network with services which are not commercially feasible. 
Routes and frequencies are determined by the PTE; 
 
This model hasn’t been applied in any other European country so far. New Zealand has a 
liberal bus market similar to Britain’s model. 
 
London was singled out in de 1985 Transport Act because national authorities wanted to 
control traffic and transport in the national capital. In rural areas these functions are carried 
out by the County Councils. 
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Regulations and the Transport Act 2000 
Bus service provision for public transport in England and Wales is regulated in several 
different ways. Bus transport in London is regulated by Transport for London. Bus transport 
in the large conurbations is regulated by the PTEs. 
 
The PTA s and PTEs are funded by a combination of local tax and grants from national 
governments. The PTEs have four common challenges and goals: 
 
-  improve economic performance by public transport 
- Promote sustainable development 
- Use public transport to avoid social exclusion 
- Reversing the decline in bus use 
 
After the elections of 1997 the Labour Party gained the majority in the House of Commons 
and presented only one year later the White Paper “A new deal for Transport”. This Paper 
proclaimed more competences for the PTAs and PTEs and set aside the old policy.  
It presented two possibilities to exercise these competences: 
 
- Quality Partnerships, which allowed to come to voluntary agreements between local 
authority and the operator on quality of bus services. Authorities could commit 
themselves to improve infrastructure (like bus stops an bus lanes) and in return an 
operator was held to improve services. This led to more accessible busses for 
wheelchairs, more frequent services and better instructions to drivers; 
 
- Quality Contracts, which allowed PTE’s to tender a network of bus services to an 
operator. This was only allowed if there was no other way to make quality 
arrangements with the operator. 
 
In all PTE-areas the goals are pursued in various ways. PTE’s produce the strategies for the 
development of local public transport in the region. They plan and fund socially necessary bus 
routes, set up partnerships with private operators and invest in local transport by financing 
new bus stations and improving train stations. 
 
Recent developments 
The 2007 Local Transport Act (LTA) proposes further possibilities for regulation regarding 
bus operators. The PTAs are now Integrated Transport Authorities and are fully responsible 
for local transport plans. 
Among others, an ITA can own and lease buses, ITAs can set down voluntary agreements 
between operators in the region and prevent them from investigation by the competition 
authorities. By preserving the agreements the ITA increases the integration of different 
transport network from different operators.  
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The LTA provides the possibility for quality contracts to include maximum fares as well as 
maximum frequencies. But most important is, that the approval process for the quality 
contracts is locally determined. The ITA determines whether or not it is necessary to set up a 
quality contract. 
 
Comparison 
Competition in public bus services has in some regions improved service levels and even 
reduces fares, but in most areas it has significantly reduced service. In rural areas bus services 
are only in peak-hours. It is not clear whether the decline in services is a result of competition 
in public bus services because services were already declining. It has certainly not stopped the 
decline in services and ridership. 
 
Another result of competition is the increase in scale of the bus companies. In 1985 the two 
nation bus companies, NBC and SBG were divided in over 80 different companies to compete 
with one another. In the past ten years the bus market is dominated by the so called ‘Big 5’. If 
operating scales of the bus companies will increase, competition will fall, as in the 
Netherlands with only three major bus companies left. With less competitors the treat comes 
that there will be lesser biddings in tendering and companies will consolidate in their regions. 
 
Bus usages has increased in areas where the transport policies of the PTAs are well 
coordinated by PTE/ITEs through Quality Partnerships. Investments in infrastructure are 
prioritized and marketing, transport information and timetables are coordinated. 
 
The private model has gained more finesses over the years. There are operators developing 
complete networks and realizing growth. Quality contracts are introduced for the development 
of infrastructure and operators guaranteeing extra services. The original goals weren’t directly 
achieved. Though public funding stopped initially, socially desirable bus routes had to be 
tendered to maintain a integrated network. Passenger rates are increasing only recently since 
PTE/ITEs are improving the quality of bus services through Quality Partnerships. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
The tender system has led to a decline of public funding in Swedish public transport. Because 
operators are merely carry out the schemes made up by the PTAs they are losing their 
commercial interest in their clients: the passengers. As a result, passenger satisfaction is 
falling.  
The British privatization system has led at first to a decrease of passenger usage of public 
transport. Bus routes are run commercially, but couldn’t make up a fully integrated network. 
In the Netherlands the British organization model can’t be applied because it is impossible to 
separate the commercially attractive routes from the other routes. 
  
The idea is that learning from both countries, a model can be developed with competitive 
tendering, professional principality and better public transport. 
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What can we learn? 
Examining the Swedish organization model we learn that professional principality is highly 
developed. Swedish PTAs are in control of the process as a whole and monitor the operators 
to adjust services if necessary.  
Tendering keeps the operator focused on quality and price. In Sweden an operator always 
feels the threat of losing their business to a competitor in a next tender. During the concession 
period operators are kept focused through the system of penalties and awarding. 
 
The British example teaches us that the main transport connections, i.e. the commercially 
feasible routes can be arranged differently than the socially necessary routes. Private operates 
can come up with an economically optimal plan for main connections, while the PTE fills in 
the socially required routes. 
Also we see that when PTE and operators work together as partners with a common goal the 
can achieve both less public spending and increasing quality in public transport. Operators 
should be involved in the development of the bus network in an equal way, they must be 
given the possibilities to use the commercial knowledge of the local or regional market. 
CASE STUDY: STADSREGIO ARNHEM NIJMEGEN 
For the second tender of the local and regional public transport services in 2013, the 
Stadsregio Arnhem Nijmegen (SRAN, city-region) is looking for a way to avoid the risks of 
only a few interested operators and choosing an selecting an operator which cannot offer 
enough quality.  
The city-region has chosen to consult possible operators in a competitive dialogue. They have 
advanced plans to discuss several subjects with private parties to sharpen their demands for 
public transport. 
Besides there tender strategy, the city-region had chosen for transit oriented development. 
Since the regional spatial plan of 1998 the city-region has focused on situating the new 
developments in the region along the existing railways. Because of this it isn’t surprising that 
in the next tender also spatial development is involved to attract new operators or consortiums 
of operators and real estate developers. 
 
The city-region has selected several issues to discuss with interested operates. Such issues are: 
- Scale of the HOV network (network of high-frequent bus route); The city region wants 
to involve operators in creating the main network and leave the supporting routes to 
the market;  
- Expansion of infrastructure; The city-region want to discuss with operators on their 
interest to design, build and maintain new infrastructure; 
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- Possibilities of new transport modes; As the city-region is exploring a tramway 
connection in the City of Nijmegen, feasibility of this connection will be consulted 
with the interested operators; 
- Method of finance; A consultation on financial compensations of contributions will be 
organized;  
- Spatial developments; The interest of operators and consortiums in spatial 
development must be consulted in order to set the most optimal requirements for the 
procurement. 
 
Also the city region want to discuss issues like marketing, branding, communication and  
transport management. 
COMPETITIVE DIALOGUE 
Competitive dialogue is a form of procedure in the procurement process whereby potential 
operators are invited to participate in the formation of the requirements. Until recently local 
authorities had only three types of procurement available.  
- Public tendering 
- Selected tendering 
- Negotiation 
 
“In 2004 the competitive dialogue was introduced by the European Parliament and the 
Council. It was presented as a public sector procurement procedure for particularly complex 
contracts” (Hoezen and Dorree, 2008).  
 
A competitive dialogue is different from a benchmark because it is a two way process. Both 
the authority as the operator give one another information to create the most optimal set of  
requirements and the best tender for public transport in a particular region. Benchmarking is, 
the authority gathering information and comparing operator’s interest to complete its set of 
requirements for tender. 
 
The dialogue can be seen as a three-step cyclic process; 
1) At first the PTE set its primary demand and goals and translating them in market 
challenges. The competitive dialogue must be prepared well. The PTE should consider 
what to discuss with possible operators; 
2) Further on the PTE has to decide which subject are fit to discuss with private parties. 
What are the policy goals and what services are commercially attractive? 
3) The PTE consults operators on possible network designs, infrastructural projects and 
other challenges for the future; 
4) Finally, the PTE evaluates the bids and translates them in a second round of 
requirements. This can be repeated several times until the PTE and operators agree on 
the set of requirements that will be set in the market. 
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We see the competitive dialogue in public transport as the process the UK bus market went 
through during the last 25 years. In a competitive dialogue this process will be experienced in 
a several bidding rounds. Each layer of challenge the PTE and operators come across will be 
defined in the phases of dialogue. 
 
Operators must be approached and attracted to participate in the competitive dialogue. They 
won’t easily deliberate on their experiences in public transport elsewhere and must be 
persuaded. We believe the competitive dialogue must be a part of the tendering process and 
the operators should be able to earn credits, discount in the offering stage or win money in a 
contest. This way more operators are willing to participate in the dialogue and their 
contributions will be of better quality. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The PTA in the Netherlands should learn from the best practices in both Sweden and Great 
Britain. In the public transport sector we should use the competitive dialogue procedure more 
often. Tenders of public transport in the Netherlands are complex procedures which demand a 
flexible approach. The competitive dialogue procedure allows the contracting authority to 
make their initial demands in consultation with the possible operators with great knowledge in 
the field. The competitive dialogue improves the scheme.  
 
The private bus operators should be seen more as partners to achieve a common goal. The 
operators have knowledge of passengers and their wishes and should be involved in setting up 
the network through consultation. 
 
In every region must be searched for a market situation and a partner/operator that fits that 
particular region. In a creative region the authorities should look for a creative operator in 
public transport. One that willing to cooperate and share its goals with the region. 
 
We consider the competitive dialogue as a way to experience the changes in organization in 
Great Britain in one tender. Through dialogue PTA and operators can, as equal partners, make 
choices in public transport and make up the requirements for good public transport in a 
region. In dialogue a region can find their partner for public transport. 
In the first round the PTA and operator determine what routes are essential. Both parties make 
up which routes are ‘commercial feasible’ and can be left to the market. In a second round the 
social contract is being formulated. The PTA sets its requirements for the social routes, while 
the operators come with improvements. As a authority commits itself to improvement of the 
infrastructure the operator bid on higher quality in bus services and finally the PTA continues 
with the operator with the best interest in the region. 
 
During the concession, flexibility must be conserved. The contract between PTA and operator 
is not a blue print that lasts for over 15 years. How can we focus the operator during the 
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period  of time? In the Scandinavian countries the PTA challenge their operators with a 
penalty and awarding system and in Britain the operators are stimulates through passenger 
revenue. Is it possible to find a mixture of these instruments that varies through time during 
the concession? 
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